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Community Property and the Copyright Act: Rodrigue's
Recognition of a Community Interest in Economic Benefits

I. INTRODUCTION
George Rodrigue's "Blue Dog" appears inmost ofhis artistic pieces. Modeled
after the family pet, George created the vivid and easily recognizable image in 1984
while married to his wife, Veronica. Since then he has seen.the image become
somewhat of a celebrity in itself. Advertisers have used it to sell products such as
Absolute Vodka and Xerox Copiers; and, if you look closely, it can be seen on the
wall of the famous coffee shop in the television series Friends. With the
tremendous success of the "Blue Dog" image, George achieved both national
acclaim and financial prosperity, but behind the scenes, a bitter dispute waged to
determine the rights to the popular icon.'
In 1993, George Rodrigue sought a divorce fromhis wife ofalmost thirty years,
sparking a boxing match of sorts over the substantial revenues generated from his
copyrighted works. In an effort to gain access to the proceeds, each former spouserelied on an opposing legal regime to aid their case. In Veronica's comer, there was
Louisiana's community property law2 which is based on the fundamental principle
that property acquired during the marriage is shared equally between the spouses.3
Louisiana's matrimonial regime, adopted during Spanish colonization,
conceptualizes marriage as a team effort. Regardless of which spouse produced the
earnings, both are entitled to an undivided half-interest of all community property
upon termination of the marriage.4 With this in mind, Veronica argued her
entitlement to half of"all intellectual property rights generated during the existence
of the community and.., all post-community artworks that are 'derivative' of that
intellectual property."5
In George's comer, there was the federal Copyright Act of 19766 which
specifies that ownership of a copyright "vests initially in the author" at the time of

Copyright 2001, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. It is important to note that the dispute revolved around the rights to all intellectual property,
including, but not limited to the Blue Dog.
2. La. Civ. Code arts. 2325-2437. In addition to Louisiana, eight other states follow the
community property theory of marital property: Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin.
3. La. Civ. Code art. 2338 provides, in part, that community property consists of "property
acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort, skill, or industry ofeither spouse";
see also Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 1.1 at 1, 16 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (2d ed. 1997) [hereinafter Spaht & Hargrave].
4. See also Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 3, § 3.2 at 47 ("No matter how married couples
organize their lives-one earning income, the other managing the home ... the basic rule is that they
share equally in whatever each produces and accumulates.)
5. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432,434 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,No. 00-1059, 2001
U.S. LEXIS 2007 (March 5,2001).
6. 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1101 (1996).
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the creation ofthe work.7 A copyright comes into existence when an author fixes
an original work of authorship in a tangible medium of expression.' George
argued that because federal law grants ownership of a copyright solely to the
author, it preempts any state law that attempts to assign any right to his ex-wife.
Therefore, he claimed his copyrighted works never became community property,
and were thus exempt from division and partition after divorce. He sought a
declaration that he alone was the owner ofall intellectual property represented in
his artwork.
George won the first round when the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana held that the Copyright Act in fact preempted state
law, thus recognizing George as the sole owner of his copyrighted works.9 The
judge believed that it was not the proper role of a court oflaw to attempt to make
the two regimes compatible. ° Undaunted, Veronica returned and scored a
subsequent victory when the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

reversed the district court finding a permissible coexistence between the two
sources of law." In an elaborate'and complex opinion, the court ingeniously
harmonized state and federal law such that George maintained exclusive control
of his copyrights, while granting Veronica an economic interest in the benefits
generated by copyrighted artworks created during the marriage.'
This article endorses the appeals court decision, arguing that it promotes
Congress' effort to protect former spouses without offending the goals of the
Copyright Act.'3 Indeed, in the past, Congress has decisively reacted to Supreme
Court findings of preemption of community property laws by legislatively
overruling the decisions to allow for the application of state law in order to
safeguard the contributions and financial interests of former spouses. Taking
heed of past Congressional reactions, the Rodrigue decision carefully preempts
the state community property laws that conflict with the purpose of the Copyright
7. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (1996).
8. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1996).
9. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 547 (E.D. La. 1999).
10.

Id. at 546.

11. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 218 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 2000)
12. We are satisfied that the conclusion we reach today-that an author-spouse in whom
a copyright vests maintains exclusive managerial control of the copyright but that the
economic benefits of the copyrighted work belong to the community while it exists and to
the former spouses in indivision thereafter-is consistent with both federal copyright law
and Louisiana community property law and is reconcilable under both.
Id. at 435.
13. The dispute over whether the federal Copyright Act should preempt state community property
laws has been the subject of numerous law review articles from across the country. See, e.g., Peter J.
Wong, AssertingtheSpouse'sCommunityPropertyRightsin Copyright, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 1087 (1995)
[hereinafter Wong]; Carla M. Roberts, Worthy ofRejection: Copyright as Community Property, 100

Yale L.J. 1053 (1991) [hereinafter Roberts]; Lydia A. Nayo, Revisiting Worth: The Copyright as
Community Property Problem, 30 U.S.F. L. Rev. 153 (1995) [hereinafter Nayo]; David Nimmer,
Copyright Ownership by the Marital Community: Evaluating Worth, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 383 (1988);
and Dane S. Ciolino, Why Copyrights are Not Community Property, 60 La. L Rev. 127 (1999)

[hereinafter Ciolino].
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Act while harmlessly allowing a revenue-generating community interest to
survive. This result not only satisfies the principals of federal preemption but
also reflects the will of Congress. 4
After summarizing the holding in Rodrigue, Part II analyzes the Supreme
Court cases which found federal preemption of state community property laws,
arguing that their holdings display extreme indifference to the fundamental
principles of community property. Furthermore, Part II illustrates that the
Congressional reactions, in the wake of these Supreme Court decisions, signify a
deep concern for former spouses and possible rejection ofthe majorities' reasoning.
Part III addresses the implications of recognizing a community interest in
copyrights by quelling objections made by intellectual property scholars.
Compiling the logic expressed in Part IIand III, Part IV applies the test provided
in the Supreme Court case, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo,' to illustrate that the
Rodriguedecision not only satisfies Court's express mandate, but also recognizes
the sanctity of community property.' 6 Finally, Part V offers a brief analysis ofthe
potential problems that might arise when courts try to assign a value to copyrighted
works in divorce proceedings. Before proceeding, however, a brief discussion of
federal preemption analysis may be useful.
The thrust ofGeorge Rodrigue's argument relied on the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution which states that "[l]aws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law ofthe Land."' 7 When state and federal law oppose each
other, state law must yield.'" If Congress clearly indicates that federal law governs
a particular matter, the Constitution demands preemption of state law.
Most of the time, however, Congressional intent is not so expressly stated and
courts are left to determine the precise scope ofthe federal statute. The Supreme
Court has recognized two forms of "implied preemption." 9 Field preemption
occurs when "the scope of a statute indicates that Congress intended federal law to
occupy a field exclusively."2 ' Conflict preemption exists when it is impossible for
a private party to comply with both state and federal laws, without frustrating the
14. Given that nine states composed ofnearly 80 million people follow the community property
theory of marital property, Rodriquelikely will become the chief authority on the subject.

15. In Hisquierdo, the Supreme Court of the United States announced that the test for
determining if a federal statute preempts state community property laws was "whether the right as
asserted conflicts with the express terms of federal law and whether its consequences sufficiently injure
the objectives ofthe federal program to require nonrecognition." 439 U.S. 572,583, 99 S.Ct. 802,809
(1979). Because the first part of the test is a straightforward preemption analysis, and the second
requires investigation into the practicability ofapplying state law, this article addresses both subjects.
16. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 6A.03[A] ("The
application of Hisquierdoto the copyright context is apparent.") [hereinafter Nimmer]; Wong, supra
note 13, at 1097 ("The preemption of state community property laws by federal copyright law is
governed by the Hisquierdopreemption test.").
17. U.S. Const. art. VL
18. Rodrigue v. Rodrigue, 55 F. Supp. 2d 534, 537 (E.D. La. 1999); see also Gade v. National
Solid Wastes Management, 505 U.S. 88, 112 S.Ct. 2374 (1992).
19. Ciolino, supranote 13, at 135.
20. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287, 115 S.Ct. 1483, 1487 (1995); see also
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79, 110 S. Ct. 2270,2275 (1990).
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purpose and objectives set forth by Congress." Courts resort to resources such as
legislative history, preemption jurisprudence, and federal policy in order to
determine a federal statute's effect on state law.
However, there is a strong presumption against preemption.' The Supreme
Court professed this fundamental principle, embedded in the concept of federalism,
when it declared:
Where... the field which Congress is said to have pre-empted has been
traditionally occupied by the States, 'we start with the assumption that the
historic police powers of the States were not to be superceded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose ofCongress. "
Furthermore, the Supreme Court requires a heightened standard when it comes to
state laws relating to the family.24 The Supreme Court clearly indicated that a
substantially greater showing of conflict is required to find federal preemption;
indeed "[a] mere conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and familyproperty law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and substantial' federal interests
25
before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden."
Therefore, the issue in Rodriguehinged on whether Louisiana law-which states
that "property acquired during the existence of the legal regime through the effort,
26
skill, or industry of either spouse" becomes community property ---could be
amicably reconciled with the Copyright Act's grant of copyright ownership to the
author-spouse.

I. RODRIGUE V. RODRIGUE
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by dissecting the precise
language of § 201(a) of the Copyright Act which states that ownership of a
27
"[c]opyright in a work ... vests initially in the author or authors of the work."
The court wasted no time in highlighting how it believed Veronica could share in
the profits from the copyrighted works created during the marriage without
offending the express wording of the Act. The court observed that the term
"copyright," according to § 106,2" simply translated into the five exclusive rights:

21. Id.
22. See Gade, 505 U.S. 88, 116, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 2392 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101 S. Ct. 2114, 2129 (1981)).
23. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S. Ct. 1305, 1309 (1977) (quoting Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct. 1146, 1152 (1947)).
24. See id.; see also In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593, 10 S. Ct. 850, 863 (1890) ("The whole
subject ofthe domestic relations ofhusband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws ofthe States
and not to the laws ofthe United States.").
25. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352, 86 S. Ct. 500, 507 (1966).
26. La. Civ. Code. art. 2338.
27. 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(a) (1996) provides in full: "Initial Ownership: Copyright in a work
protected under this title vests initially in the author or authors of the work. The authors of ajoint work
are co-owners of copyright in the work."
28. 17 U.S.C.A. § 106 (1996) provides:
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reproduction, adaptation, publication, performance, and display. It announced that

"none of these rights either expressly or implicitly include the exclusive right to
enjoy income or any of the other economic benefits produced by or derived from
copyrights."2'9 Because revenues were not an exclusive right mentioned in the
definition of "copyright," the court concluded that Louisiana law did not conflict
with federal law by recognizing Veronica's community interest in proceeds from
sales or licences of George's artwork. Furthermore, the section only addresses
"initial" vesting, leaving open the implication that the copyright could later be
shared with non-authors."
The remainder of the court's opinion elaborated on legal support for its
holding. The court began by discussing the Louisiana Civil Code provisions
regarding ownership of property in general. Outlining the civilian concepts ofusus,
abusus, andfructus,the court demonstrated how both Veronica and George could
share in-the copyrights while still abiding by the provisions of the federal law.3
The court explained:
The author-spouse alone holds the elements of usus and abusus ... free
of any management, consent, or participation of the non-author
spouse... [t]he community during its existence (and the former spouses
or other successors after its termination) holds the element offructus, i.e.,
the right to receive and enjoy the economic benefits produced by or
derived from the copyright.3
The court then moved to a discussion of the pertinent Civil Code articles
covering community property. The court reiterated the Civil Code's emphasis that
Subject to sections 107 through 120, the owner of a copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publically;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publically; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publically
by means of a digital audio transmission.
29. 218 F.3d 432,435(5th Cir. 2000).
30. Id. at 436.
31. The court explained the three subcategories of civilian ownership as "(1) usus-the right to
use or possess, i.e., hold, occupy, and utilize the property; (2) abusus-the right to abuse or alienate,
i.e., transfer, lease, and encumber the property, and (3)fructus-the right to the fruits, i.e., to receive
and enjoy the earnings, profits, rents, and revenues produced by or derived from the property." Id. at
437; see also La. Civ. Code art 477 which provides that "[t]he owner of a thing may use, enjoy, and
dispose of it within the limits and under the conditions established by law."
32. 218F.3dat437.
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marriage normally gives each spouse the right to manage, control, or dispose of
community property.33 If this principle was applied to a copyright without
restriction, the court warned it would offend the Act's five exclusive rights granted
to the author of the copyright. In an effort to reconcile this apparent conflict, the
court relied on Civil Code article 2351 which states: "A spouse has the exclusive
right to manage, alienate, encumber, or lease movables issued or registered in his
name as provided by law."' The court complimented its discovery by offering
numerous examples, such as a car title or a paycheck, where one spouse has
exclusive management of community property and the other shares enjoyment of
those assets.3 5 The court stated that "[u]nder Louisiana law a copyright is
'movable,' and under federal law a copyright is issued or registered in the name of
'
Thus, copyrights neatly fit into the definition ofa "registered
the author-spouse." 36
movable."
The appeals court turned next to the express preemption provision contained
in the Copyright Act. Specifically, § 301(a) states that the Act governs "all legal
or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright."37 The court easily dismissed the notion that the phrase
"general scope of copyright" might cover the entire field of marital property.38
Furthermore, the court concluded that the very language of the Act indicates an
intent to preempt only certain state laws. 39 The court reasoned that, unless a state
law was equivalent to or presented an irreconcilable clash with one of the five
exclusive rights designated to the author (i.e., reproduction, adaptation, publication,

performance, and display), the state law continued to operate. The court remarked:
Notably absent from the Copyright Act's exclusive sub-bundle of five
rights is the right to enjoy the earnings and profits of the copyright.
Nothing in the copyright law purports to prevent non-preempted rights
33. La. Civ. Code art. 2346 provides: "Each spouse acting alone maymanage, control, or dispose
of community property unless otherwise provided by law."
34. La. Civ. Code art. 2351.
35. 218 F.3d at 438. The court held that:
[a] paycheck issued by the employer in the name of the employee-spouse alone can be
cashed, deposited, or otherwise negotiated only by that spouse; yet, the proceeds of the
paycheck, representing earnings ofone spouse in community, belong to the community.
Likewise, amotor vehicle purchased with community funds but titled in the name ofone
spouse alone can be sold, leased, or encumbered only bythe named spouse; yet the proceeds
ofany such disposition belong to the community. And when, during the existence of the
community, one spousejoins an existingpartnership or joins in the formation ofanew one,
the partner-spouse has the exclusive right to participate in the partnership and to manage,
alienate, or encumber that interest; yet theeconomic benefits---and liabilities-flowing from
the partnership belong to the community.
36. Id. at 438.
37. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (1996).
38. 218 F.3d at 439.
39. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 301 (b) (1996) which provides that "[n]othing in this title annuls
or limits any rights or remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to ...
activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any ofthe exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright as specified in § 106."
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frombeing enjoyed by the community during its existence or thereafter by
the former spouses in community as co-owners of equal, undivided
interests. 4°
Finally, the court addressed George Rodrigue's contention that allowing state
law to prevail would do substantial damage to important federal interests. 4' He
claimed that allowing either spouse, acting alone, to control, encumber, or dispose
of the copyrights, would impair national interests in uniformity and efficient
exchange ofcopyrights.42 In addition, he argued that it would lessen the incentives
for authors to create.43 The court, however, dismissed George's uniformity
argument and offered examples contained in the Act allowing for the application of
differing state laws. For example, the Act permits copyrights to be transferred by
conveyance, which themselves are governed by state laws covering contracts and
have not disabled federal interests." As for lessening of creative incentive, the court
did not believe that a husband-author would not produce a copyright simply because
he would have to share the proceeds with his wife. Further, even after divorce, it
would be absurd for the author to45not exploit pre-divorce copyrights because he
would receive no benefit himself.
In the end, the court recognized Veronica's claim to "an undivided one-half
interest in the net economic benefits generated by or resulting from copyrighted
during the existence of the community and from any
works created by George
46
derivatives thereof."
II. SUPREME COURT PREEMPTION OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY LAWS

Even though the Supreme Court professes to hold a deep respect for state
family laws, it has nevertheless, found irreconcilable conflicts between community
property and various federal statutes.47 It will be shown, however, that Congress has
been hostile to these decisions and, in fact, has disagreed with the reasoning of the

40.
41.
42.

218 F.3d at 440.
Id.at441.
Id.

43.
44.

Id.
Id.; see also 17 U.S.C.A. § 201 (d)(1) (1996) which provides: "The ownership ofa copyright

may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation oflaw, and may be
bequeathed by will or pass as personal property by the applicable laws ofintestate succession."
45. 218 F.3d at 442.
46.
47.

Id.
See, e.g.,
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 117 S.Ct. 1754 (1997) (Louisiana community

property laws preempted by ERISA); Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802 (1979);
McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728 (1981) (military retirement benefits are not
divisible in state court decrees as community property); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 70 S.Ct.
398 (1950) (federal law governs ownership of benefits from veteran's life insurance policy); Free v.
Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 82 S. Ct. 1089 (1962) (rejecting wife's community property claim to one-half the
proceeds ofa life insurance policy her husband, a deceased Army officer, had purchased during their
marriage under a federally assisted program for members ofthe military).
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majority as evidenced bylegislative action." Furthermore, this author suggests that
the Fifth Circuit opinion in Rodrigue compliments what is evidently a strong
Congressional concern for former spouses.
A. Hisquierdov. Hisquierdo

Hisquierdo arose from a divorce proceeding in California where the wife
claimed an interest in her husband's interest in future benefits under the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974 .49 The Supreme Court of California had earlier held that
the benefits were community property because they flowed in part from the
husband's employment during the marriage. The U.S. Supreme Court, however,
reversed, holding that the Railroad Retirement Act controls the allocation of the
retirement benefits. The anti-alienation section of the Act, § 23 im, states that the
benefits could not be taken from the railroad worker "under any circumstances
whatsoever."'" In addition, §23 ld(c)(3) specifically mentioned termination ofnonparticipant spouses' rights to individual benefits under the Act.52
After creating the test to be applied, the majority relied heavily on § 23 Im and
§ 231 d(c)(3) to answer "whether the right as asserted conflicts with the express
terms of federal law." The court concluded that § 23 im preempted any state law
that attempted to take away or alienate any portion ofthe benefits from the intended
beneficiary, i.e., the railroad worker. Furthermore, the section protects the benefits
from legal process "notwithstanding any other law... of any State."53 According
to the court, § 231 d(c)(3) embodied a community property concept to an extent, but
Congress purposefully abandoned that theory upon divorce to ensure the railroad
worker alone would receive all of the accrued payments.
In deciding whether the application of community property laws would
"sufficiently injure the objectives ofthe federal program to require nonrecognition,"
the court stated that allowing state law to grant the wife an interest in retirement

48. Inthe copyright context, some community property supporters have analyzed these Supreme
Court cases in order to highlight the differences between those federal statutes and the Copyright Act,
e.g., Nayo, supra note 13, at 169 ("There are significant differences between the interests implicated
by the Copyright Act and those interests involved in past cases where the preemption doctrine has been
applied against the . . . community property system."). Although the author agrees with these
arguments, this section addresses the flawed reasoning of the majority opinions when compared to
Congressional reactions.
49. 45 U.S.C.A. §231 (2000).50. Inre Hisquierdo, 566 P.2d 224 (1977).
51. 45 U.S.C.A. (1996) §231(b) provides in part: "Notwithstanding any other law ofthe United
States, or of any State, territory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity shall
be assignable or be subject to any tax or to gamishment, attachment, or other legalprocess under any
circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated..." (emphasis added).

52. "The entitlement of a spouse of an individual to an annuity... shall end on the last day of
the month preceding the month in which ... the spouse and the individual are absolutely divorced."
45 U.S.C.A. § 231d (cX3) (1996).
53.

Id.
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benefits "frustrates" the Congressional design of promoting retirement and
providing for employees in their waning years.'
The majority held that
Congressional goals would be thwarted because divorced employees would be
encouraged to continue working to make up for lost benefits paid to an ex-spouse. - '
Addressing the fate offormer spouses, the justices observed that amendments to the
Railroad Retirement Act permitted garnishment of the benefits for the purposes of
spousal support and added that "those benefits will be claimed by those in need."56'
B. McCarty v. McCarty
InMcCarty,57 the Supreme Court addressed a wife's claim to a one-half interest
in her husband's military retirement pay. The Court held that federal law precludes
a state court fromdividing the benefits pursuant to state community property laws.5"
According to the majority, the military retirement system did not confer an
entitlement to retired pay upon the retired member's spouse and did not embody
even a limited community property concept.59 For instance, § 3929 of the military
retirement statutes stated that a "member ofthe Army retired under this chapter is
entitled to retired pay."' Also, Congress had announced: "[h]istorically, military
retired pay has been a personalentitlementto the retired member himself as long
as he lives."6'
With this in mind, the court focused on the fact that military retired pay
terminates with the retired service member's death and does not pass to the
member's heirs.62 The service member, however, may designate a beneficiary, not
limited to his spouse, to receive any portion that remained unpaid at death.63
Therefore, if retired pay was considered community property, the service member
could not effectively provide for the beneficiary of his choosing because the wife
would be entitled to a one-half interest. The court stated that "both the language of
the statutes and their legislative history make it clear that the decision whether to
leave an annuity is the service member's decision alone becauseretired pay is his
or her personal entitlement."' Similar to Hisquierdo,the court noted that the plight
of former spouses might be allayed by the spouse's right to claim Social Security
benefits and to garnish military retired pay for purposes ofsupport.65 In the end, the
54. Hisquierdov. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572,585, 99 S. Ct. 802,810 (1979) ("Congress has fixed
an amount thought appropriate to support an employee's old age and to encourage the employee to
retire. Any diminution of that amount frustrates the Congressional objective.").
55. Id. at 590, 99 S. Ct. at 813.
56. Id. at 590, 99 S. Ct. at 812.
57. 453 U.S. 210, 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 224, 101 S. Ct. at 2737.
60. 10 U.S.C.A. § 3929 (1956).
61. 453 U.S. at 224, 101 S. Ct. at 2737 (citing S. Rep. No. 1480,90th Cong., 2d sess., 6 (1968)).
62. Id. at 215, 101 S. Ct. at 2732.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 226-27, 101 S. Ct. at 2738.
65. Id. at 235, 101 S. Ct. at 2743.
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Court held that community property partition of retired pay, by reducing the
amounts that Congress had intended to provide solely for the retired service
member, had the potential to frustrate this important Congressional objective.
C. The DissentingOpinions
Both Hisquierdo and McCarty contained lengthy and bitter dissents. In
Hisquierdo,Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Rehnquist, found no conflict between
the Act and community property laws. He consistently reiterated the principle that
state laws regarding the family were not easily preempted, but only upon a
substantial showing of harm to federal interests. To Justice Stewart, the only
question was "whether something in the federal Act prevents the State from
applying its normal substantive property law, under which assets acquired during
marriage are commonly owned by the husband and wife."" He stressed that the
majority misunderstood the principles underlying community property. Aninterest
in retirement benefits, Justice Stewart argued, was co-owned by the spouses during
the marriage and recognizing the wife's interest upon divorce was not a
"garnishment" but rather a proper distribution of half-owned assets. According to
Justice Stewart, § 23 lmwas intended to apply to creditors; therefore, the majority's
67
reliance on § 231m was misplaced. In addition, Justice Stewart explained
that § 231d(c)(3) does not conflict with state law, rather it compliments the
community property principle that the spouse's interest "attaches only to that
portion of an annuity attributable to labor performed duringthe marriage."6"
In McCarty,Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart,
restated the fundamental nature of state family laws. Indeed, he chastised the
majority for failing to quote or cite the test for preemption established in
Hisquierdo."9 He analyzed previous cases wherein the Court preempted state
community property laws and argued that in each case explicit provisions offederal
law clearly commanded preemption of state law. However, Rehnquist remarked
that "this forceful and unambiguous language protecting the rights ofthe designated
7
beneficiary has no parallel so far as military pay is concerned."
In particular, Rehnquist criticized the Court for relying on the premise that
there was no community property concept at all in the statutory scheme of the
federal retirement statutes. He noted that the Court in Hisquierdoacknowledged
that Congress provided some community property rights in § 23 1d(c)(3) of the
7
Railroad Retirement Act but deliberately decided to terminate them upon divorce.

66.
67.

Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 591, 99 S. Ct. 802, 813 (1979).
Id. at 599, 99 S. Ct. at 817 ("For under community property law, the husband and wife are

not one another's creditors; they are co-owners. Upon dissolution of the martial community, the
community property is divided, not adjudicated as indebtedness.").

68. Id.
69. McCarty, 453 U.S. at 236, 101 S. Ct. at 2743.
70. Id. at 240, 101 S. Ct. at 2745.
71. Id. at 244, 101 S. Ct. at 2747 (citing Hisquierdo,438 U.S. at 584-85, 99 S. Ct. at 810
"Congress carefully targeted the benefits created by the Railroad Retirement Act. It even embodied a
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Rehnquist argued that "this absence would have been thought to suggest that there
was no preemption, since the argument could not be made, as it was in Hisquierdo,
that Congress had addressed the question and drawn the line. 72
D. CongressionalReaction and Observation
Even though the dissenting opinions were unable to command majority support
in the Supreme Court, they found a receptive audience on Capital Hill. Congress
legislatively overruled73 Hisquierdo and McCarty and amended the Railroad
Retirement Act and the military retirement statutes to allow for the application of
community property laws.74 In fact, after McCarty, Congress enacted the
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act, 7 which returned retired pay
division to the states in an attempt to "strike a balance between the competing
interests ofretirees and their former spouses. '76 Commenting on Congress' actions,
Professors Katherine Spaht and Lee Hargrave explain: "The United States Supreme
Court was not receptive to state community property policies in deciding that
federal retirement plans would be the separate benefits ofthe covered employees.
Congress, however, reversed those decisions and provided for the application of
state community property laws in significant areas."77
The Congressional response to the insensitive treatment of former spouses in
Hisquierdo and McCartyshould lead not only to the conclusion that Congress is
concerned about the financial well-being offormer spouses, but also that Congress
7
recognizes the efforts of non-working spouses."
The holdings in Hisquierdoand
community concept to an extent . . . Congress purposefully abandoned that theory, however, in
allocating benefits upon absolute divorce ... ").
72. Id. Rehnquist additionally recognized that "the ex-spouse has contributed to the earning of
retired pay to the same degree as the serviceman, according to state law." Id. at 245, 101 S. Ct. at 2747.
73. Pub. L. No. 98-76, § 419(a)(3), 97 Stat. 411,438 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 231m(b) (Supp.
1 1985); Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-252, §§ 1001-03,96 Stat.
730, 730-36 (1982).
74. See Spaht &Hargrave, supranote 3, § 3.37 at 112. ("In the following year, Public Law 98-76
was adopted to legislatively overrule Hisquierdoand to make Railroad Retirement Act annuities subject
to state community property laws..."); Delrie v. Harris, 962 F. Supp. 931 (W.D. La. 1997) ("Congress
concerned with the effects McCartywould have on divorced spouses ofmilitary personal ... enacted
the Former Spouses' Protection Act with great alacrity in 1982"); Captain Kristine D. Kuenzli,
Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act: Is There Too Much Protectionfor the Former
Spouse, 47 A.F. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1999) ("Criticism of the McCarty decision focused primarily on the
court's extension and application of the federal preemption doctrine.").
75. 10 U.S.C. §§ 1408, 1447-50, 1072, 1076, 1086 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
76. Captain Allison A.Polchek, Recent PropertySettlementIssuesforLegalAssistanceAttorney,
1992 Army Law. 4, 5 (1992) [hereinafter Polchek].
77. Spaht & Hargrave, supra note 3, §§ 3.40, 3.45.
78. On the other hand, Congress acknowledged the sacrifices and contributions ofmilitary
spouses. The spouses ofmany service members must abandon their own careers to follow
the service members around the world. Only rarely can a military spouse ensure his or her
own retirement security by contributing toward a pension or health system. Congress saw
the USFSPA as a way to compensate spouses for these sacrifices
Polchek, supranote 76,-at 5.
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McCarty did not simply recognize a participant-spouse's sole interest in his
retirement benefits; the holdings completely discarded community property's
fundamental principle that "spouses are deemed to have contributed equally to the
acquisition ofthe property, regardless of the actual division of labor in the marriage
79
'
and regardless of whether only one spouse formally 'earned' it." As Justice
Stewart's dissent in Hisquierdonotes, the majority missed the point by assuming
that former spouses would be financially protected by the availability of
garnishment proceedings:
The right of each spouse to his or her share of the community assets, then,
is a substantive property right entirely distinct from the right that a spouse
might have to the award of alimony upon dissolution of the marriage. A
community property settlement merely distributes to the spouses property
which, by virtue of the marital relationship, he or she already owns. An
alimony award, by contrast, reflects a judgment that one spouse--even
after the termination of the marriage-is entitled to continuing support by
the other.8s
The belief that alimony suffices to compensate former spouses is repugnant to the
very essence of the community property theory because it denigrates the
contributions of the non-breadwinner spouse."' Former spouses are given "scraps,"
i.e., support payments, instead of a recognition of their rightful ownership ofa onehalf interest in former community property.
The Congressional reactions also serve to discredit the majorities' conclusions
that the application of state community property laws would frustrate Congressional
objectives. For example, in McCarty Justice Blackmun, writing again for the
majority, stated that "the reduction of retired pay by a community property award
not only discourages retirement by reducing the retired pay available to the service
member, but gives him a positive incentive to keep working, since current income
2
after divorce is not divisible as community property." By amending the Act to
allow for the application of community property laws, Congress registered its
disagreement with Justice Blackmun's pessimistic appraisal. At the very least, these
legislative responses should resuscitate the hefty requirement that, in order to find
preemption, state family laws must do "major damage" to "clear and substantial
An illustration ofMcCarty's tremendous insensitivity for former spouses is best reflected in
Justice Blackmun's statement that "if retired pay were community property, the service member could
not so deprive the spouse of his or her interest in the property." 453 U.S. 210, 226, 101 S. Ct. 2728,
2738 (1981) (emphasis added). When this shocking announcement is compared to legislative concern
for former spouses, the majority opinion's reasoning suffers even greater damage to its longevity.
79. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 593, 99 S. Ct .802, 814 (1979) (citing Susan W.
Prager, The Persistence ofSeparatePropertyConcepts in California's CommunityPropertySystem,
1849-1975, 24 UCLA L. Rev. 1,6 (1976)).

80. Id.
81. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 1059 n.43 ("Community property systems recognize that the
contribution ofone spouse to raising children and maintaining a home has the dual effect oflimiting
that spouse's earning capacity.").
82. Id. at 235, 101 S. Ct. at 2742.
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interests." Refering to the enactment ofthe Uniformed Services Former Spouses'
Protection Act (USFSPA) after McCarty, one commentator goes a bit further and
argues:
The vigorous Congressional response... ought to restrain the Supreme
Court in two ways in future preemption cases concerning state law
distribution of marital property. Most broadly, this response should
caution the Court against readily inferring Congressional intent from weak
and equivocal sources. . .More narrowly, Congressional dissatisfaction
...specifically refers to federal preemption ofvital substantive aspects of
state domestic relations law. Regardless of the preemption standard
generally used by the Court... a more deferential view should be taken
ofstate marital property regulation. Under either reading, USFSPA and
its history not only undercut the rationale of McCarty; they also instruct
the Supreme Court to apply a more deferential preemption standard, which
arguably would have yielded a different result in McCarty itself.83
In any case, Congress' response to McCarty and Hisquierdoclearly commands
courts to attempt to seek out a means of protecting former spouses."
Because Rodriguemarked only the second time the issue was addressed in the
courts, it is conceivable that Congress simply overlooked the potential conflict
between state community property laws and the Copyright Act. By negative
implication, Congress' reversal ofthe Supreme Court's decisions in Hisquierdoand
McCartyillustrate that Congress would have approved a decision protecting former
spouses.85 If the Copyright Act were to completely preempt state community
property laws, it would create the potential of leaving many former spouses
completely unprotected. For example, if the majority of marital income was
generated from a copyright, the non-author spouse would be left with virtually
nothing. The Copyright Act does not contain a provision, like the statutes in
83. Grace Ganz Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment ofPensions, Disability Pay, Workers'
Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance,or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L.
Rev. 1250, 1308 (1986).
84. In Boggs v.Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997), the Court overruled the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals and held that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
preempted community property laws in so far as it allowed a deceased non-participant spouse to make
a testamentary transfer of her community interest to her children. The husban d later remarried and died
while married to his second wife. Thus, the dispute over the retirement benefits was between the second
wife and the first wife's children. Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court noted Congress' deep
concern for the surviving spouse. ("Congress' concern for surviving spouses is also evident from the
expansive coverage of § 1055") Id. at 843, 117 S.Ct. at 1761. ("These provisions are essential to one
ofREA's central purposes, which is to give enhanced protection to the spouse and dependant children
in the event of divorce or separation, and in the event ofdeath ofthe surviving spouse")Id. at 847, 117
S. Ct. 1763. Therefore, this author believes Boggs does not demonstrate a continued trend of
preempting state community property laws, but in fact illustrates the Supreme Court's new-found
recognition of the plight of former spouses.
85. See Nayo, supra note1 3, at 167 (Congress' failure, in its revision of the Copyright Act, to
take into account considerations of community property principles does not justify depriving the
community of its otherwise valid interest in the fruits of the time, talent, and energy of each spouse.").
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Hisquierdo and MCarty, which would permit garnishments for the purposes of
spousal support. Therefore, the consequences of preemption would conflict with
Congress' efforts to protect former spouses. In McCarty, the majority stated that
"Congress may well decide... that more protection should be afforded a former
spouse." 6 Congress has made this decision and it is up to the courts to enforce it.
For this reason, Congress should be receptive to Rodrigue's court-fashioned
harmonization of state and federal law.
III. CALMING THE FEARS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SCHOLARS

Rodrigue's imaginative approach was so original that its reasoning had not
been addressed by the majority of commentators. Most scholars assumed that
courts in community property states would follow the logic espoused in Worth v.
8
According to Worth
Worth 7 and rely on § 201(d) of the Copyright Act.
by operation
transfers
author,
the
in
vesting
initially
after
copyright,
ofa
ownership
spouses.
the
by
co-owned
becomes
and
laws
property
community
state
of
Intellectual property scholars argued that the effects of Worth threatened to damage
important federal interests in copyrights. Their arguments typically restated two
common themes: (1) ownership of a copyright cannot be transferred after "initial
vesting" 9 and (2) community property principles of co-ownership would damage
the marketability of copyrights."
This section addresses these issues and demonstrates that Rodrigue does not
offend any of these concerns. Further, the court's holding can be expanded and
made adaptable to all community property jurisdictions.
A. Transferof CopyrightOwnership.
In an attempt to counter Worth's reliance On § 201(d) of the Copyright Act,
intellectual property scholars analyzed the succeeding subsection which states that
"no action by any governmental body... purporting to ...transfer... any of the
exclusive rights under a copyright, shall be given effect under this title."'" David
86. 453 U.S. at 235-36, 101 S. Ct. at 2742-43.
87. In In reMarriageof Worth, 241 Cal. Rptr. 135 (1987), a California Court held for the first
time that ownership of a copyright was a community property asset. In Worth, the court considered
whether copyrights in trivia books authored by the husband during marriage survived federal
preemption. As discussed in Part IV, the court relied on the fact the Copyright Act permits some
involuntary transfers of copyright ownership, and thus held that California community property laws
transferred an interest to the non-author spouse.
88. "The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of
conveyance or by operationoflaw" 17 U.S.C.A.§ 201(d) (1996) (emphasis added).
89. See Ciolino, supra note 13.
90. See Roberts, supranote 13. Carla Roberts additionally argues against recognizing copyrights
as community property "because such treatment pi-ovides a disincentive for authors to create work." Id.
at 1053; see also Ciolino, supranote 13, at 127,129 (1999) (illustrating how the novelist, Tom Clancy,
claimed he would rather eliminate the character, Jack Ryan, from his books then give proceeds to his
ex-wife); but see Wong, supranote 13, at 1104-06, for a thorough rebuke of these claims.
91. Nimmer, supranote 16, at § 6A.03 (citing 17 U.S.C.A. § 201(e) (1996)) (emphasis added).
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Nimmer, a national authority on copyrights, notes that the House Committee Report
only considered bankruptcy proceedings and mortgage foreclosures to be outside
the scope of the section.'a Because filing for bankruptcy implies one's consent to
have his copyright ownership transferred to the bankruptcy estate, Nimmer argues
that "the application of community property laws to copyrighted works stands or
falls based on whether married authors have at least implicitly consented to transfers
oftheir work."'93 Thus, he stresses the only way to circumvent the Copyright Act's
prohibition against transferring ownership would be to hypothesize that, by entering
into marriage, the author agreed to subject his copyrights to the laws ofcommunity
property-an idea he ultimately rejects. In addition, Dane Ciolino, in a recent law
review article, argues that the reasoning of Worth is particularly inapplicable in
Louisiana.94 He claims that because ownership ofa copyright "vests initially" in the
author, it could not later be transferred to the non-author spouse because: (1) such
transaction is preempted by federal law and (2) no provision of Louisiana law
purports to do so.95
However, Nimmer argues in favor of preemption because of a lack of
theoretical evidence to support an implied consent by the author to transfer
"exclusive rights under a copyright," and Ciolino refers to a copyright as a "bundle
of rights." Alluding to § 106, both scholars' own definitions limit the Copyright
Act's coverage to the rights of distribution, adaptation, reproduction, performance,
and display. The Rodriguedecision, however, does not attempt to transfer any of
the author's exclusive rights to the copyright, because recognizinga community
property interest in revenues does not transfer anything covered under the Act.
Quite simply, § 301(e) is irrelevant to the issue in light ofRodrigue'sholding. The
appeals court expressly stated that "[w]e are cognizant of . . . the "transfer"
approach of the California court in Worth ... [o]ur approach is consistent yet
analytically distinct.""
B. Co-Ownershipand Marketability
Carla Roberts, arguing for preemption ofcommunity property laws, states that
"the Worth decision creates significant uncertainties... by calling into question the
validity of copyright transfers that are notjointly executed by copyright transferors
and their spouses."" She is joined by other intellectual property commentators who
fear that Worth's rationale, by allowing for the application of community property
laws, might be construed to suggest that spouses are co-owners of copyrights.9
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Ciolino, supra note 13.
95. Ciolino, supra note 13, at 130; see also, Nayo, supra note 13, at 162 ("Copyright scholars
contend that this language applies to attempts by federal, state, or local governments to seize copyright
licences").
96. 218 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 2000).
97. Roberts, supra note 13, at 1053.
98. See Nimmer, supra note 15, § 6A.02; Nayo, supra note 13, at 165 ("It is charged that the
court left numerous issues related to joint ownership of copyrights under the Copyright Act unresolved

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 61

Thus, a non-author spouse could unfairly exploit the work personally or grant a
nonexclusive licence to third parties." However, these fears are put to rest by the
holding in Rodriguethat the author-spouse has the "exclusive right" to manage the
copyright." °
Rodrigueappears limited to Louisiana in applicability because the court based
0
In
its management rule on a provision contained in the Louisiana Civil Code.
addition, Ciolino recognizes that, even amongst the nine community property
jurisdictions, laws governing the management ofcommunity assets are "remarkably
diverse.""1 2 For example, state law variances might permit a non-author spouse in
3
State X to sell the copyright, while State Y affords an author exclusive control.
Further, differing state community property laws would force purchasers of a
copyright to familiarize themselves with divergent laws in order to be certain they
are acquiring a perfect title from a person authorized by law to sell the copyright. "°
Due to intricate conflict-of-law issues, the confusion might increase exponentially
5
if a couple resided in numerous states during their marriage.
As Nimmer explains: "What is needed is a vehicle ...that confers absolute,
rather than primary responsibility upon the author-spouse and that applies to all
community property States .... ."" A simple solution to this problem lies in
allowing the Copyright Act itselfto govern the management ofcopyrights between
spouses. In community property terms, the exclusive rights provided in § 106 are
"management rights" over the copyright. For instance, the right to "distribute"
reflects the author's ability to sell, lease, or otherwise alienate his work. The
Copyright Act clearly demands that the author have the exclusive right to "manage"
his creations. The Act preempts any state community property law that either
allows the non-author spouse to dispose of the copyright or gives the author
anything less than absolute control.
Thus, the Copyright Act's §106 provides the universal rule for the management
of a copyright, regardless of any variances between the community property
07
Without
states-the author alone has the authority to manage his copyright.

when joint owners are spouses.").
99. Nimmer, supra note 16, § 6A.02.
100. 218 F.3d at 438-39.
101. See La. Civ. Code art. 2351.
102. Ciolino, supra note 13, at 149; see also Nimmer, supra notel6, § 6A.02.
103. See Roberts, supra note 13, at 1062-65; Ciolino, supra note 13, at 141-50.
104. See Roberts, supranote 13, at 1053.
105. See In re Peregrine Entertainment, 116 B.R. 194, 200 (1990) ("Because copyrights are
incorporeal-they have no fixed situs-a number of state authorities could be relevant ....Thus
interested third parties could never be entirely sure that all relevant jurisdictions have been searched.").
106. Nimmer, supra note 16, § 6A.04.
107. Peter Wong was one of the first commentators to recognize the potential for having the
Copyright Act provide the management rules of a copyright between spouses in community property
states.

[I]t can be argued that federal copyright law preempts state community property law on the
issue ofjoint management and control by the author and spouse as co-owners. Accordingly,
even though the spouse's ownership interests in the copyright are not preempted by federal
law, the spouse's management and control under community property laws may be
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diving into the intricacies ofsales law, purchasers ofcopyrights would be safe in the

assumption that a valid transfer of ownership by sale could be effected only by the
author himself. Finally, although this article makes no attempt to investigate the
effects in equitable-distribution states, there is no reason to believe that the
Copyright Act could not supply the rules of copyright management in those
jurisdictions as well. The Act preempts any state management law to the extent it
conflicts with the author's exclusive control.
IV. APPuCATION OF HIsQuiERDo'STWO-PART TEST

A. Whether the Right asAsserted Conflicts with the Express Terms ofFederalLaw
Hisquierdo dealt with a spouse's right to retirement benefits upon divorce.
According to the Supreme Court, the Railroad Retirement Act employed language
such as "notwithstanding any other law" and "legal process under any circumstances
whatsoever" to conclusively reflect Congress' intent to prohibit state laws from
attempting to classify benefits as community property. In McCarty, the Supreme
Court noted that Congress had stated that military retirement benefits were
traditionally a "personal entitlement." When compared to the parallel provision in
the Copyright Act, it is evident that these explicit directives are not present.
Section 301(a) ofthe Copyright Act preempts "all legal or equitable rights that
are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights."'08 As the Rodrigue court noted,
Congress must have been aware that community property laws were in effect in nine
states." Therefore, Congress could have chosen to expressly mention the Act's
effects upon community property if they believed it would undermine the purposes
of federal copyright law."0 For example, Individual Retirement Accounts are
governed by the federal Internal Revenue Code which declares that "[t]his section
shall be applied without regard to any community propertylaws.... In any case,
Congress did not "positively require by direct enactment" that community property

preempted.
Wong, supranote 13, at 1115; see also Nayo, supra note 13, at 160.
108. 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (1996).
109. In a footnote, the court cited one of its past decisions for the proposition that the "case for
federal preemption is especially weak when there is evidence that Congress was aware ofoperation of
state law and nevertheless... tolerates whatever tension might exist between them." Rodrigue, 218
F.3d at 440 (citing Brown v. Ames, 201 F.3d 654,661 (5th Cir. 2000)); William Patry, Copyrightand
Community Property: The Question ofPreemption, 28 Bull. Copr. Soc'y 237 (1981) (arguing that
"Congress was aware of the vesting of equal rights in community property states, and by its silence
allowed of the vesting an implied assignment of a one-half interest to the non-author spouse by
operation of the community property laws.").
110. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,112 S. Ct. 2374 (1992)
(Souter, J., dissenting, stated "ifCongress had meant to say that any state rule should be preempted if
it deals with an issue as to which there is a federal regulation in effect, the text.., would have been a
very inept way of trying to make the point.").
111. 26 U.S.C.A. § 408 (g) (1986 ) (emphasis added).
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be pre-empted." 2 In fact, Congress arguably left the door open for the application
ofcommunity property laws in the manner illustrated by Rodrigue. Section 301(b)
ofthe Copyright Act provides:
Nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes ofany State with respect to... activities violating
legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section
106 ....
Rehnquist states in his dissenting opinion in McCarty that if "community property
law conflicts ...then by all means override [community property law]-to the
extent of the conflict.""4 As explained in Part III, a state law that allows a nonauthor spouse to sell, i.e., "distribute," the copyright would certainly "conflict with
the express terms offederal law." The Copyright Act has decisively bestowed this
exclusive right upon the author alone. However, the Rodrigue decision cleverly
avoids any interference with the author's exclusive rights. Because the recognition
of a community interest in the profits from a copyright is not conflict with the rights
provided within § 106, § 301(b) expressly allows it to survive preemption.
B. Whether its ConsequencesSufficiently Injure the Objectives ofthe Federal
Programto Require Non-recognition
As illustrated above, the Copyright Act does not reflect an intent to preempt all
community property laws. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court stated that Congress'
paramount goal in passing the Copyright Act of 1976 was to enhance predictability
and certainty of copyright ownership." 5 A quick summary of the discussion
contained in Part III illustrates that the recognition of a community interest in the
revenues received from copyrights does not even "scratch" these noble concerns:
When a copyright is produced during marriage, the Copyright Act grants
the author exclusive control over his creation. Thereafter the author can
freely assign the exclusive licence to his work, market only the right of
reproduction, or sell the copyright completely without having to obtain
permission from his spouse. Additionally, even if the spouses reside in
numerous states, each with their own management rules, a valid sale could
only be effected by the author himself.
Although intellectual property scholars warn ofthe dangers of allowing copyrights
to become community property, most admit that allowing a spouse to receive
financial income does not pose a threat to the interests ofcopyright ownership. For
example, Roberts stresses that community property principles would damage the
112.
113.
114.
115.

(1989).

Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 582, 99 S. Ct. 802, 808 (1979).
17 U.S.C.A.§ 301(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
453 U.S. 210, 245,210 S. Ct. 2728, 2747 (1981) (emphasis added).
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2177
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author's incentive to create, produce uncertainties in copyright titles, and even
impose an impermissible burden of interstate commerce."'
However,
distinguishing the two elements of copyright ownership, Roberts concedes that "it
is appropriate to treat the right to income element as community property, but that
it is inappropriate

. . .

to treat the control element as community property.""...

Furthermore, Nimmer states that "the goal must be to preserve the rights of author's
spouses while8 not impinging on the author's ability effectively to exploit their
'
copyrights." "
The recognition of a community interest in economic benefits offers the best
of both worlds. It gives a non-author spouse an economic interest in property
acquired during the existence of the community, while rightfully permitting the
author absolute control over their copyrighted creations." 9 This solution not only
leaves the Congressional goals ofpredictability ofcopyright ownership undisturbed,
it also furthers Congress' concern for the protection of former spouses.
V. THE PROBLEM OF VALUATION

Permitting the economic benefits ofa copyright to become community property
will, nevertheless, present problems for a court in determining the value of a
spouse's interest in works created after termination ofthe marriage. 20 The court
in Rodrigue remanded the case, directing the district court to determine which
copyrights were subject to the rules of community property, either directly as
created during the marriage, or indirectly as products of such works. 2 ' Because an
economic interest represents a community asset, it must be assigned a value by a
court before it can. be partitioned. The responsibility of designating a value,
however, is no simple task. For example, assume that George Rodrigue, five years
after his divorce, places a tiny Blue Dog in the lefthand comer of an elaborate
painting. Because he created the copyrighted image during the marriage, Veronica
would be entitled to a portion ofthe proceeds received from the sale of the work.
However, there remains the distinct question of how much. It would be difficult to
determine what portion ofthe value of the painting was derivative of the original
copyright and what was the value ofthe original production. Also, factors such as
increased notoriety and market conditions after divorce might cause George's art
to fetch a higher price."2
116. Roberts, supranote 13.
117. Id. at 1071,n.3.
118. Nimmer, supra note 16, at § 6A.04.
119. See Nayo, supra note 13, at 178-79 ("The Copyright Act's basic premise has always been to
bestow upon copyright holders a monopoly on exploiting the aspects of the copyright, to the exclusion
of all other third parties.").
120. See Nimmer, supra note 16, § 6A.02, n.16 ("Undoubtedly, questions of fact will arise as to
whether a given work was composed before, during, or after marriage. Subsidiary questions will also
be posed as to what proportion was written before, during, and after marriage.").
121. 218 F.3d 432,442.43 (5th Cir. 2000).
122. See Ciolino, supranote 13, at 169 (discussing the many problems in valuing derivatives of
post-community copyrights); Nimmer, supra note 16, § 6A.02 n.1 6.
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Nevertheless, under Rodriguethe courts are burdened with the unenviable task
ofdetermining what portion ofthe proceeds are attributable to the community and
what portion constitutes the author's separate property. Even though an infinite
number offactors could influence the value ofa derivative ofa copyright, courts have
consistently rejected the notion that a value cannot be assigned to an asset because it
is too speculative. " Professor Lee Hargrave adds thatthe "inability to make a perfect
division should not be the basis to totally exclude one ofthe owners of a right from
enjoying its benefits."'' Although no case has directly addressed the issue of
assigning a value to the community interest of a copyright, several cases provide
guidance for some ofthe factors that a court should take into consideration.
In Due v.Due,"2 a lawyer's rights under a contingent fee contract were deemed
to be community property. The court determined that the contract was an obligation
based upon the right to receive money in the future and therefore constituted a
patrimonial asset partially acquired from husband's efforts during the marriage. In
order to determine the value, the court stated that the "interest in the community is
determined in proportion that the value ofthe husband's services rendered at the date
ofthe community's dissolution bears to the total services performed by the husband
in earning the fee."' 2 The crucial consideration, the court observed, was the period
of time the lawyer spent working on the case during the existence ofhis marriage.
Therefore, the longer he worked while married compared to his efforts after
dissolution, the greater the community interest in the contract.
This pro-rata approach was followed inMichelv.Michel,'27 where the court faced
the daunting task ofvaluing the community interest oftwo literary works prepared
during the marriage, consisting ofresearch notes and rough drafts, but published after
divorce. The court, rejecting the author's assertion that partially completed literary
works were her separate property, stated that a "[w]riter's literary works constitute a
patrimonial asset which forms a part of the community insofar as its value is based2s
upon the writer's services performed during the existence of the community."'
Finding that some of the author's work formed the foundation for the completed
novels, the court awarded the non-author husband ownership in twenty-five percent
of the value and receipts ofthe first novel, and five percent for the second.' 29

123. See Lee Hargrave, MatrimonialRegimes, 53 La. L. Rev. 877, 887 (1993) (citing Michel v.
Michel, 484 So. 2d 829 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1986) and Boyle v. Boyle, 459 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1984) for the proposition that courts should not refuse to value an asset because of speculation);
Deliberto v. Deliberto, 400 So. 2d 1096 (La. App. Ist
Cir. 1981) ("In determining the amount ...
any
reasonable method may be used, even, in difficult cases, to the extent of averaging the conflicting and
exaggerated estimates of witnesses.").
124. Hargrave, supra note 123, at 889; but seeCiolino, supra note 13, at 169-170 (suggesting that
the difficulty in assigning a value to post-termination derivatives constitutes an additional reason
Congress should not reform federal copyright law to accommodate community property jurisdictions).
13122
125. 342 So. 2d 161 (La. 1977).
126. Id. at 163.
127. 484 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986).
128. Id. at 833.
129. Id.
at 834.
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Surprisingly, a case arising out of Illinois, which is an equitable-distribution state,

provides the best analogy to the copyright context. It illustrates that the difficulty of
assigning a value is not unique to community property jurisdictions. In reMarriageof
Heinze 3 ° faced the dilemma ofapproximating each spouse's interest in future royalties
generated from the wife's four speech therapy books written during the marriage. The
wife claimed that future book sales would be enhanced by the fact that she would
continue to give speeches and attend workshops on the subject of speech therapy.
Additionally, the wife asserted that there was "a definite connection between her name
recognition and the sales of her books."'' Further, a representative for the wife's
publisher indicated that he could not predict how many books would be sold in the
future or how long the company would continue to publish the books.
Even in the face of numerous uncertainties, the court overruled the trial court's
finding that royalties were too "speculative" to be assigned a value."' Noting that
Illinois' definition ofmarital property was almost identical to California's definition of
community property, the court was persuaded by the reasoning in Worth that future
royalty income was marital property.' 33 The court considered all ofthe variables that
might cause a fluctuation in the potential income and ruled that the "petitioner's efforts
entitle her to a larger share of the royalties."'' The court thus awarded the wife
seventy-five percent, and the husband twenty-five percent, ofthe incoming revenues
from the books created during the marriage. 3
MichelandDue represent judicial efforts to assign a community interest in works
spanning the existence and dissolution of the marriage. Although the In re Heinze
decision arose in an equitable-distribution jurisdiction, the case is illustrative ofthe
problems that can arise in community property states as well. All of these cases,
130.

631 N.E.2d 728 (111.
App. Ct. 1994) This case was cited as authority in Washington, a

community property state, in Shultz v. Schultz,No. 40306-1-1, 1998 Wash. App. LEXIS 1176 (August

10, 1998).
131.

631 N.E.2d at 732.

132. Id.at731.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 732. The court also relied upon Dunn v.Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah Ct. App.
1990), where the court held that future royalty income derived from the husband's invention ofsurgical
instruments constituted marital property. The court found that the wife was entitled to one-half ofthe
royalties received from the invention, less an appropriate deduction for the time her husband spent
generating the royalty income.
135. Id.; In re Marriage of Heinze also highlights the tax issues that are implicated when one
spouse receives income from formerly community property and must pay a determined percentage to
the other. Because the publisher pays the author directly, the court noted that the wife would bear the
entire federal and state income tax liability. In an effort to correct this inequity, the court offset the
husband's award in the following manner:
(1) the petitioner shall compute the amount of each royalty from... [the publisher] ...
which is attributable to sales of the four books written during the marriage ... (2) the
petitioner shall determine her liability for federal and state income taxes on the gross
royalties based upon her applicable taxbracket; (3)the petitioner's income tax liability shall
then be deducted from the gross royalties... (4) the petitioner shall pay the respondent 25
of the net royalties from the four books.
Id. at
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nevertheless, reflectthe benefits ofthe pro-rata approach to valuation because "the risk
that the works will not be successful and the chance of great success is shared by the
spouses. To determine the value of such labor for immediate compensation would be
difficult and unrealistic.""'
In determining each spouse's entitlement to future revenues from a copyright, the
most important factor must be the effort expended by the author in creating the work
duringthe marriage because it determines the community interest. The same analysis
would apply to copyrights created beforethe marriage. For example, if an author left
his copyright completely unchanged during the entire existence of the marriage, there
would no community interest at all. The revenues from the copyright would be his
separate property. Ifthe author, however, made improvements ormodifications to the
copyright, no matter how small, a court would have to determine what portion ofthe
changes were attributable efforts made during the existence to the community.
Artistic copyrights, of course, are exposed to numerous unforeseen factors that
might lead to a fluctuation in its market value. For example, an increase in market
value ofthe copyright caused by greater notoriety ofthe author would be difficult for
a court to predict. As was demonstrated inHeinze,post-termination endeavors by the
artist might lead to an increase in value of the copyrighted work. In that case, the exspouse might realize a windfall because the increase would not be attributed to the
community. Indeed, courts might try to persuade parties to enter into voluntary
agreements whereby the spouses determine the valuations themselves.'37 Parties then
could not complain later when the share intheir proceeds either increases or decreases.
VI. CONCLUSION

In addressing the issue of copyright preemption of community property laws,
Nimmer states that "[a] better solution.., absent legislative redress.., is to search
out the underlying principles of both bodies of law and to work out an
accommodation of the interests of each."'3 Arguably, the Rodriguecourt heeded
his advice. The Copyright Act's main purpose is to ensure the marketability of
136. Spaht & Hargrave,supra note 3, § 3.30 at 100; see also Id. at 101:
The courts, however, have adopted the pro rata approach in classifying incorporeal
movables. It has been applied to pensions, contingent fee contracts. . and to literary
property. It seems that the trend will be to expand the use of the pro rata approach in
dealing with movables. This development in the jurisprudence is supported by the similar
policy adopted by the 1980 code revisions in providing for mixed ownership of sorts as a
result of donations by spouses and for pro rata treatment of awards for future lost wages
when those losses span a period ofcommunity and a period ofseparate property. (footnotes

omitted).
137. See Due, 342 So. 2d at 166 (Justice Tate stated the reason for remand to the trial court in
order to calculate precise percentages partly revolved around the possibility ofan "amicable partition
and settlement in accordance with the principles noted."); see also Worth, supra note 86 (where the
spouses entered into a voluntary agreement to equally distribute the proceeds of acopyrighted work);
In re Marriage ofHeinze, 631 N.E.2d at 732 (the court rejected the husband's suggestion of a 60
percent to 40 percent division of the royalties).

138. David Nimmer, CopyrightOwnership by the Marital Community, 36 UCLA L. Rev. 383,
402 (1988).
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copyrights by vesting the copyright owner with exclusive control ofhis creation.
Community property, in turn, recognizes the contributions of both spouses to
property acquired during the marriage. As demonstrated above, permitting a
community property interest to exist in the revenues ofa copyright does not impact
the copyright's marketability. Nevertheless, the beauty ofRodrigue'sreconciliation
of the two systems of law comes not from what it does not do, i.e., affect the
author's exclusive rights, but from what it does. Rodriguesupports the presumption
against preemption of state family laws without offending the goals ofthe Copyright
Act. More importantly, the decision compliments Congress' growing concern for
the plight of former spouses and confirms the sanctity ofthe community property
theory.
GarthR. Backe

